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Judges will construe the law as liberally as possible in favour of
liberty, but they cannot make laws; they are only to expound them:
particular cases must yield to the law, and not the law to particular
cases. - Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 97 Eng. Rep. 29, 48
(H.L. 1758).
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, Congress answered the Court's challenge to provide the
Bush Administration with the legal authority to try Guantanamo Bay
detainees in the War on Terror in military commissions.1 The Military
Commissions Act of 2006 ("MCA") was signed into law by President
Bush a few months after the Hamdan decision. 2 Controversial on
many levels, the MCA purports to strip the federal judiciary's and the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petitions of the
detainees. 3 Specifically, MCA section 7(a) provides that "[n]o court,
justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the United States who has been determined by the United
States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant. '4 Dur-
ing the Senate's consideration of the bill, the Senate narrowly defeated
an amendment offered by then-Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, Arlen Specter, aimed at retaining the Court's habeas
jurisdiction by striking MCA section 7 in its entirety.5 Thus, assuming
the MCA is construed as stripping the detainees of the right to habeas
relief, the roughly 400 alien Guantanamo Bay detainees must contend
with the procedures laid out by Congress in the MCA and those proce-
dures alone.
6
While a plain reading of the MCA suggests that Congress in-
tended to strip the federal courts' statutory habeas jurisdiction over
1. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006). "Absent a more specific
congressional authorization, the task of this Court is .. . to decide whether Hamdan's
military commission is so justified."
2. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006)
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a); See also S. 3930, 109th Congress (as passed by the Senate,
September 28, 2006 and as passed by the House of Representatives, Sept. 29, 2006).
3. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §2241).
4. Id. at § 7(a). Section 3, delineating the finality of Commission proceedings,
contains language parallel to section 7, stripping federal court jurisdiction over "any claim
or cause of action whatsoever ... relating to the prosecution, trial, or judgment of a military
commission ... including challenges to the procedures of military commissions under this
chapter." Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 3 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950j).
5. S. Amdt. 5087 to S. 3930, 109th Congress (defeated Sept. 28, 2006). This
amendment was defeated 51-48 primarily along party lines.
6. See GlobalSecurity.org, Top U.S. Court Declines to Hear Guantanamo Prisoners'
Appeal, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2007/04/sec-070402-voa03.htm
(last visited April 2, 2007).
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the claims of the detainees, 7 the Act does not purport to alter a de-
tainee's constitutional claim to habeas corpus. The Constitution
provides that the "privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public
safety may require it."8 Although the MCA modifies section 2241 of
Title 28 of the United States Code, the section of the code enumerating
the federal judiciary's power with respect to the Writ,9 it does not make
the requisite findings of "rebellion" or "invasion" necessary for the sus-
pension of the Writ. Therefore, despite stripping the federal courts of
their statutory grant to issue habeas corpus writs,1° the MCA leaves
the constitutional right to habeas intact. Of course, this presupposes
that an alien prisoner confined by the United States in a United States'
military base in Cuba does have a constitutional right to habeas
corpus.
In a 2-1 decision the D.C. Circuit ruled otherwise, holding that
the alien detainees in Guantanamo Bay do not have a constitutional
right to habeas corpus. 1' Shortly thereafter the Supreme Court denied
one group of prisoners' expedited petition for certiorari. 12 The Court
initially voted 6-3 to reject certiorari, observing in one statement for
Justices Stevens and Kennedy that the petitioners must first exhaust
the procedures provided for in the MCA.13 The three dissenting jus-
7. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 988 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
8. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 9, cl. 2.
9. Although beyond the scope of this paper, there is a robust argument regarding
whether absent the statutory grant to issue writs of habeas corpus the courts could rely
simply on the Suspension Clause as a source of authority to issue the Great Writ. Compare
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Constitution does "not guarantee any content to (or even existence of) the writ of habeas
corpus"), with St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 304 n.24 (contending that the Framers could not have
intended for the Writ to be permanently suspended absent Congressional action). See also
Ex Parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 95 (1807) (noting that the first Congress "must have felt...
the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege
should receive life and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself
would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted"). Various jurists and
commentators have utilized Chief Justice Marshall's somewhat ambiguous language in Ex
Parte Bollman to support the argument that the Constitution at a minimum guarantees the
right to the Writ regardless of an authorizing statute, as well as the opposing view that the
right can only be activated by Congressional action. For the purposes of this paper, I
assume the Suspension Clause is self-executing.
10. See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 988, 994. Both the majority and dissent concluded in
Boumediene that the MCA did strip statutory habeas jurisdiction.
11. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 992-93.
12. Hamdan v. Gates, 127 S.Ct. 1507, 2007 WL 632778 (U.S.), 75 USLW 3473 (March
5, (2007). Justices Souter and Breyer would have granted to the motion to expedite
consideration.
13. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S.Ct. 1478, 2007 WL 957363, (U.S. April 2, 2007).
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tices would have granted the petition to determine whether the MCA's
habeas-stripping provisions were constitutional and to "help establish
the boundaries of the constitutional provision for the writ of habeas
corpus." 14 Still, the majority left the door open to future certiorari peti-
tions, noting simply that the detainees' failure to exhaust the available
remedies made it inappropriate for the court to review the case "at this
time."15
In an unusual reversal, on June 29th, 2007, the Court voted to
reconsider its order denying certiorari and voted to hear the detainees'
petition. 16 Oral arguments were held on December 5th, 2007.17 From
oral arguments, it is clear that in reaching its decision the Court will
engage in an in-depth historical analysis to determine whether the
Suspension Clause, as understood by the Framers as incorporating the
English common law's conception of the Great Writ, constitutionally
guarantees the detainees' right to habeas review.' If so, the Court
should reach the issue as to whether the MCA validly suspended the
Writ, or in the alternative, whether the MCA provides an adequate
substitute forum in which to vindicate the detainees' rights, thereby
abrogating the need for Congressional suspension. Therefore, a clear
understanding of the scope of the Writ at English common law will
play a paramount role in the Court's decision.
This article will analyze whether alien detainees held at the
military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have a constitutional right to
habeas corpus by examining the extraterritoriality of the Writ as it ex-
isted in England as understood by the Framers. Part I briefly reviews
the Supreme Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence. Part II discusses
the evolution of the Great Writ at common law. Part III compares the
historical extraterritorial reach of the Great Writ to the detention at
Guantanamo Bay, arguing that the common law understanding of the
Writ would reach the detainees' claims because: (A) Guantanamo Bay
is part of the United States' domain, (B) the prolonged imprisonment of
the detainees by the United States has created an association analo-
14. Id. at 1479.
15. Id. at 1479 (emphasis added).
16. William Glaberson, Supreme Court to Hear Guantanamo Detainees' Case, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/29/washington/29cnd-
gitmo.html?ex=1340769600&en=192c9901fcfbale6&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.
17. Robert Barnes, Justices Appear Divided on Detainees' Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,
2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/05/
AR2007120500257.html.
18. Id. Justice Scalia pressed petitioners' lawyer Seth Waxman to cite a single case in
500 years of English law permitting the extension of habeas to foreigners detained beyond
the Crown's territory.
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gous to the subject-sovereign relationship necessary for the
extraterritorial extension of the Great Writ at common law; and (C)
denial of the Writ's application to Guantanamo Bay perpetuates the
existence of a legal vacuum at the military base. Finally, this section
argues that the minimal scope of review afforded by the MCA falls
short of the process afforded to habeas petitioners at common law, con-
cluding that because the MCA does nothing to close the legal black hole
at Guantanamo Bay, it is not an adequate substitute for the constitu-
tional rights guaranteed by habeas corpus.
I. THE HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE UNITED STATES:
FROM RATIFICATION TO TODAY
This section briefly outlines the history of habeas corpus, begin-
ning with the inclusion of the Suspension Clause at the Constitutional
Convention. It then discusses the Supreme Court's reliance on history
when decoding the scope of the Great Writ.
A. Inclusion of the Suspension Clause
In 1787, the Framers met in Philadelphia to address the fail-
ures of the Articles of Confederation; the result was'the Constitution.
There was little debate surrounding the adoption of the Suspension
Clause at the Constitutional Convention. A nineteenth century
Harvard Law professor opined that the Suspension Clause was in-
cluded, in part, as a reaction to a 1777 Act by Parliament targeting the
rebellious colonists by declaring them traitors and authorizing the
seizing and imprisonment of those suspected of treason. 19 The 1777
Act further provided that the accused colonists should remain in cus-
tody for a number of months and that no judge could issue bail or hold
a trial without the permission of the Privy Council. 20 This was an af-
front to the colonists because the Writ had operated in all thirteen
colonies at a minimum since 1707 when it was extended officially by
Queen Anne,21 although it was utilized in the colonies well before the
official extension. 22 It was against this backdrop that Charles Pinck-
19. See 17 GEO. III chap. 9; JOEL PARKER, HABEAS CORPUS AND MARTIAL LAw 21 (John
Campbell, Philadelphia, 1862).
20. Id.
21. See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 100
(Greenwood Press 1980) (hereinafter DUKER); WILLIAM S. CHURCH, A TREATISE OF THE WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS 34 (2d ed., Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1893).
22. James Oldham & Michael J. Wishnie, The Historical Scope of Habeas Corpus and
INS. v. St. Cyr, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 485, 496 (2002).
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ney of South Carolina first introduced a motion on May 29th, 1789, to
include a provision in the Constitution guaranteeing the right to
habeas corpus. 23 The original language, proposed a few months later,
stated that the legislature could suspend the Writ only "upon the most
urgent and pressing occasion and for a time period not exceeding XXX
months."24 Another delegate to the Convention, Mr. Rutlidge, advo-
cated that the Writ was inviolable. 25 By September 1787, the
Suspension Clause's language reached its current form and the Com-
mittee on Style and Arrangement moved it from Article III, that
enumerates the power of the judiciary, to its current placement in Arti-
cle 1.26
B. The Role of Historical Analysis in Habeas Corpus Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has employed historical analysis as a tool of
constitutional construction when deciphering the scope of the constitu-
tional right to habeas corpus.27 In Swain v. Pressley, three justices
noted that "the sweep of the Suspension Clause must be measured by
reference to the intention of the Framers and their understanding of
what the writ of habeas corpus meant at the time the Constitution was
23. DUKER, supra note 21, at 127.
24. Id. After it was referred to the Committee on Detail, Mr. Pinckney brought the
matter again to the Convention floor and contended that the Writ could only be suspended
for twelve months. ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT 12
(New York University Press 2001).
25. Id. at 12-13.
26. Tor Ekeland, Suspending Habeas Corpus: Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, of the
United States Constitution and the War on Terror, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1475, 1486 (2005).
William Duker noted that while some commentators viewed that the placement of the
Suspension Clause in Article I signaled the Founders' intention that the clause operated as
a restriction on Congress' power to suspend state habeas for federal prisoners, other
historians deemed the placement "irrelevant" when considered in the context of Section 9.
DUKER, supra note 21, at 131-32. The modem view is that the placement of the Suspension
Clause in Article I reflects the Founders' "conscious determination" to limit Congress'
authority. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 998 (Rogers, J., dissenting). The Suspension Clause's
placement in Article I suggests that, absent exigent circumstances, only an Act of Congress
can effectuate the clause. This is consistent with English common law whereby only the
Parliament could suspend the Great Writ. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 563 (2004)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia went on to note that [i]f the Suspension Clause does
not guarantee the citizen that he will either be tried or released, unless the conditions for
suspending the writ exist and the grave action of suspending the writ has been taken; if it
merely guarantees the citizen that he will not be detained unless Congress by ordinary
legislation says he can be detained; it guarantees him very little indeed." Hamdi, 542 U.S.
at 575.
27. Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996
Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509, 2516-17 (1998).
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drafted."28 Twenty-five years later, in INS v. St. Cyr, the Court opined
that "at the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause protects the
writ 'as it existed in 1789,"' the date of the Judiciary Act.29 Indeed, in
Rasul v. Bush, the Court contended that the point of reference for ex-
amining the scope of the Writ was the historical reach of the Writ at
common law.30 The St. Cyr Court went on to note that the fundamen-
tal principle of the writ of habeas corpus was to challenge and review
the legality of executive detention "and it is in this context that its pro-
tections have been strongest."31 The Court also asserted that the Writ
was available as of 1789, both in the colonies and in England, to review
the detention on non-enemy aliens and citizens alike.32
While agreeing that history holds the key to unlocking the scope
of the writ of habeas corpus, the judiciary has disagreed widely about
what that history actually illustrates. In numerous cases, courts cite
the same seventeenth and eighteenth century cases to reach vastly dif-
ferent conclusions. For example, in Rasul, the majority cited Lord
Mansfield's opinion in the 1759 cases Rex v. Cowle and Rex v. Schiever,
to support its holding that the application of the habeas statute to the
Guantanamo Bay detainees was consistent with the Writ at common
law.33 Yet, in his dissent, Justice Scalia utilized the same cases to ar-
gue that the extraterritorial application of the habeas statute was
inconsistent with the historic reach of the Great Writ.34
A glaring example of widely disparate interpretation of historic
precedent is Boumediene, the recent D.C. Circuit case holding that the
Guantanamo detainees do not have a Constitutional right to habeas
corpus. Writing for the two judge majority, Judge Randolph also cited
Cowle and Schiever, as well as The Case of the Three Spanish Sailors,35
to bolster his holding that the Constitution does not extend extraterri-
torially to the detainees. Indeed, Judge Randolph echoed Justice
Scalia's observations in Rasul when he contended that he could not
28. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384 (1977) (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
29. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. at 301. In a footnote, the Court observed that the difficult
inquiry into the scope of the Suspension Clause is what spurs courts to avoid this
constitutional issue by holding that statutes do not bar habeas review in its entirety. Id. at
301 n.13. Therefore, it is logical to assume that some members of the Court will try to
construe the MCA as not stripping statutory habeas jurisdiction so as to avoid reaching this
momentous and contentious constitutional issue.
30. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004).
31. Id. at 474.
32. Id. at 473.
33. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 482-83.
34. Id. at 502 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 989-99.
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find a single case where a Writ was issued to an enemy alien detained
on the authority of the Crown, but detained outside the territorial am-
bit of England and its domains. 36 In dissent, Judge Rogers argued that
the majority had "fundamentally misconstrue[d] the nature of suspen-
sion" and had misread the historical record.37 As the Supreme Court
noted in St. Cyr, Judge Rogers acknowledged that "assessing the state
of the law in 1789 is no trivial feat," opining that "the court's analysis
today demonstrates how quickly a few missteps can obscure history."
38
Noting that the majority did not cite a single case in which an enemy
being detained by the Crown was not considered within the Crown's
domain, and therefore within the reach of the Writ, Rogers cited the
same cases utilized by the majority to support her conclusion that the
constitutional reach of the Writ extends to the detainees.
39
While it is clear that historical analysis is the appropriate inter-
pretative tool a court will employ when analyzing the scope of the
constitutional right to habeas corpus, eminent jurists have scrutinized
the same history and have reached different conclusions. The follow-
ing section will examine the history relied upon by both sides to
provide a base from which to compare the detainees' situation to the
early cases, and thereby to the historic reach of the Great Writ.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE GREAT WRIT AT COMMON LAW
At common law, the writ of habeas corpus was a procedural de-
vice whereby the Writ functioned "as an assertion of popular liberties
against the Crown."40 While the Writ has evolved, its historic core
function - to determine the legality of executive detention - has
emerged unchanged. 41 Indeed, A.V. Dicey argued that "the authority
to enforce obedience to the writ is . . . [the power to] prevent any pun-
ishment which the Crown or its servants may attempt to inflict in
opposition to the rules of law as interpreted by the judges."42 The es-
sential function of the Great Writ was to bring the prisoner before the
court and to permit the court an opportunity to "obtain knowledge of
the reason why [the individual] is imprisoned" and to either set the
36. Id. at 5.
37. Id. at 9 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 14 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 14-17.
40. Edward Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L.J. 523, 526 (1923).
41. R. J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 92 (Claredon Press, 2d ed., 1989).
42. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 135
(Liberty Classics, 1982) (1885). Thus, habeas corpus exemplifies the role of the judiciary in
the separation of powers: it serves as a check on executive authority.
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prisoner free "or else see that he is dealt with in whatever way the law
requires."4 3 This section will trace the evolution of the Great Writ, be-
ginning with Darnell's Case and the formal introduction of the Great
Writ by Sir Edward Coke, and culminate in a discussion of the cases
relied upon by United States jurists whereby the seventeenth and
eighteenth century English judges tested the extraterritorial breadth
of habeas corpus.
A. The Emergence of the Great Writ in Seventeenth Century
Common Law England
The writ of habeas corpus existed well before the introduction
and ratification of the formal statutes in the seventeenth century.
44
Indeed, the origins of the Great Writ can be traced at least as far back
to the thirteenth century and the Magna Carta. 45 The twenty-ninth
section of the Magna Carta presages the formal Writ, declaring that
"[nlo freeman shall be seized, . . . nor will we commit him to prison,
excepting by the legal judgment of his peers, or by the laws of the
land."46 But some form of securing personal liberty against govern-
ment detention occurred as early as the twelfth century under the
reign on King Henry 11. 4 7 Several cases are reported where the King's
Bench issued the Writ throughout the fourteenth century up to the for-
malization of the Writ in the seventeenth century.4
8
The streamlining of the Writ was prompted by the famous 1627
Darnell's Case (also known as the Five Knights case). King Charles I
detained five knights who refused to pay forced loans to the Crown to
fund a war with Spain and France. 49 The prisoners were not indicted
upon any charge, but were detained "per speciale mandatum Domini
Regis," or by "special command of the King."50 The prisoners filed a
petition for habeas corpus with the King's Bench, squarely presenting
the issue of whether a citizen could be detained solely on the order of
43. Id. at 129.
44. Id. at 130.
45. CHURCH, supra note 21, at 3.
46. Id. One scholar notes that the evolution of the Great Writ in seventeenth century
England can been viewed as a "revival" of the Magna Carta and the notion that "no man
shall be taken except by the law of the land, translated as due process of law." DANIEL JOHN
MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA 4 (The University Press of Virginia, 1966).
47. See e.g., CHURCH, supra note 18, at 4; DUKER, supra note 18, at 15.
48. DUKER, supra note 21, at 25.
49. Louis A. Knafla, The Writ of Habeas Corpus in Early Modern England: A View from
Within, in LAw POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 368-69 (McGill-Queen's University
Press, William Kaplan & Donald McRae eds., 1993).
50. MEADOR, supra note 46, at 13.
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the King and putting the Bench in the awkward position of setting the
prisoners free and thereby defying their King in a time of war.51 Em-
ploying rather circular reasoning, the Bench ruled that it did not have
authority to issue a Writ, holding that "[ihf a man be committed by the
commandment of the king, he is not to be delivered by a Habeas
Corpus in this court, for we know not the cause of commitment."52 The
King's Bench had ruled that arbitrary detention was a part of the com-
mon law and within the King's authority.
Darnell's Case prompted a public outcry and put the issue of
executive detention on the national stage, culminating in the passage
of several habeas corpus acts over the next century. Chief among the
Bench's critics was Sir Edward Coke, the former Chief Justiceship of
the King's Bench and Member of Parliament who marshaled through
the early habeas corpus acts. First, in 1628, Parliament enacted the
Petition of Right, arguing that (1) the King did not have the authority
to detain a free person absent a lawful charge, (2) detainees were enti-
tled to a hearing before judges, and (3) detention with no temporal
limits was "against reason."53 Section 3 of the 1628 Act stated,
your subjects have of late been imprisoned without any caused
showed ... no cause was certified, but that they were detained by
your majesty's special command.. . and yet were returned back to
several prisons, without being charged with anything to which they
might make answer according to the law.
54
Because Charles I ignored this law, several refinements were made to
the Great Writ in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1640. 5 5 The 1640 Act pro-
vided the Writ to any prisoner detained by an order of the now-
abolished Star Chamber or by an order of the King or Privy Council,
and importantly, it also provided for treble damages for any violation
of the law. 56 Despite its provisions, the 1640 Act was still flawed and a
stronger law guaranteeing some process in the face of executive deten-
tion was passed in 1679.5
7
51. Id. at 13-15. This case was recognized as a great constitutional issue at the time.
Indeed, the King "packed" the court with favorable jurists by elevating Crown sympathizers
to the Bench to ensure remand of the petitioners.
52. Id. at 18.
53. DAVID CLARK & GERARD McCoy, THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL RIGHT: HABEAS
CORPUS IN THE COMMONWEALTH 37 (Claredon Press, 2000).
54. 3 CAR. I., c. 1. See also CLARK, supra note 53, at 36.
55. Ekeland, supra note 26, at 1481-82.
56. CHURCH, supra note 21, at 12-13.
57. See A.H. Carpenter, Habeas Corpus in the Colonies, 8 Am. HIST. REV. 18, 19 (1902)
(noting that the 1679 Act did not create any new law, but merely made the Writ "more
efficient").
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1. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, officially entitled "An Act for
the Better Securing the Liberty of the Subject, and for the Prevention
of Imprisonment Beyond the Seas,"5 8 serves as the foundation for the
common law understanding of the Writ.5 9 Like its predecessors, the
Act aimed at "improving the legal mechanism by means of which the
acknowledged right to personal freedom may be enforced." 60 The Act
was extremely popular amongst the English and faced little opposition
from King Charles II because at the same time the Act was being con-
sidered, the King was appealing to Parliament to resolve the thorny
issue of his successor; he was choosing his battles carefully.61 The pre-
amble to the 1679 Act states:
Whereas, great delays have been used by sheriffs, jailers and other
officers, to whose custody any of the king's subjects have been com-
mitted for criminal or supposed criminal matters, in making the
return of writs of habeas corpus.., contrary to their duty and the
known laws of the land, whereby many of the king's subjects have
been and hereafter may be long detained in prison, in such cases
where by law they are bailable, to their great charges and
vexation.
6 2
The Act guaranteed that the accused be indicted "within one term or
session after commitment" and tried or released within two terms. 63
Furthermore, the Act also provided that the Writ must be returned
within the range of three to twenty days of issuance, depending upon
whether the prisoner was located within twenty to one-hundred miles
of the issuing authority.64 The Act included a remedies provision to
ensure compliance with its measures and levied fines of up to 500
pounds for multiple infractions. 65 The Act applied to persons accused
of the most serious crimes against the Crown, including treason.
66
Unlike the Constitution's silence regarding the scope of the
Writ's reach, the 1679 Act specifically defined the territorial ambit of
the Great Writ. The Act declared that the Writ ran to "places within
58. Id. at 48.
59. Ekeland, supra note 26, at 1481-82.
60. DICEY, supra note 42, at 134.
61. CHURCH, supra note 21, at 23.
62. 31 CAR. II., A.D. 1679 (emphasis added).
63. 31 CAR. II., A.D. 1679; SHARPE, supra note 41, at 137.
64. 31 CAR. II., A.D. 1679. The military base at Guantanamo Bay is roughly 125 miles
off of the coast of Miami, Florida. Baher Azmy, Rasul v. Bush and the Intra-Territorial
Constitution, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 369, 372 (2006).
65. 31 CAR. II., A.D. 1679.
66. 31 CAR. II., A.D. 1679.
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the kingdom of England, dominion of Wales, or the town of Berwick-
upon-Tweed, and the islands of Jersey or Guernsey." 67 Nearly a cen-
tury after the passage of the 1679 Act, the House of Lords proposed ten
questions to the King's Bench regarding the Act in relation to legisla-
tion currently pending before Parliament, resulting in the 1758
Opinion of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.68 In response to one query, Jus-
tice Wilmont declared that habeas corpus was a "writ of such a
sovereign and transcendent authority, that no privilege of person or
place can stand against it. It runs, at the common law, to all domains
held of the Crown. It is accommodated to all persons and places."69 To
further ensure that all of the King's subjects could avail themselves of
the Writ's protections, the 1679 Act made it per se illegal, under the
pains of hefty penalties, to remove the prisoner to Scotland, Ireland,
Tangier, "or places beyond the seas" to avoid the reach of the Writ.
7 0
This section of the Act was passed to quash the common practice of
relocating the prisoners to countries and plantations far beyond the
territorial realm of England.71 This is consistent with the purposes of
the Act, which were to cure the defects of prior incantations of the
habeas right whereby officials would evade returning a properly issued
Writ. 72 Indeed, there are some reported instances where fines were
levied for failure to comply with the law.
73
With the passage of the 1679 Act, the writ of habeas corpus had
taken on many of the features still recognizable in its modern form.
Because England did not have a formally scribed Constitution, 74 the
1679 Act, representing the culmination of the evolution of the Great
Writ from the Magna Carta through its passage, is the analogue for the
Founder's conception of habeas corpus at common law. Like its pre-
sent day ancestor, the 1679 Act protected the King's subjects from
illegal executive detention and provided a process for effectuating that
right. The questions, however, remain: how far is the reach of the
67. 31 CAR. II., A.D. 1679.
68. See PARKER, supra note 19, at 14.
69. Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 97 ENG. REP. 29, 36 (H.L. 1758).
70. 31 CAR. II., A.D. 1679. Curiously, the Act lists Jersey and Guernsey among the
places to which prisoners cannot be moved despite the fact that the Act's earlier provisions
expressly declare that the Writ reaches these lands.
71. See CLARK, supra note 53, at 145.
72. See DICEY, supra note 42, at 131.
73. See CLARK, supra note 53, at 145.
74. The United Kingdom, U.S. Department of State (February 2007), at httpJ/www.
state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3846.htm. Britain does not have a formally written constitution.
Rather, its laws are an amalgam of Parliamentary statutes, the common law and treaties.
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Great Writ and who are the King's subjects that enjoy this fundamen-
tal privilege?
2. Calvin's Case
Prior to the formalization of the Great Writ in the three seven-
teenth century habeas acts, Sir Coke grappled with the reach of the
Writ in 1608 in Calvin's Case.75 Calvin's Case provided an analytical
framework for discussing the scope of English common law's reach into
foreign lands. The plaintiff Calvin was born in Scotland after the two
Kingdoms were unified by the succession of James VI of Scotland to the
British throne.76 One of the issues before the Exchequer Chamber was
whether Calvin could benefit from English law; this issue turned on
whether he was considered an alien. 77 Because Calvin was born after
the ascent of King James I, he was a subject of both Scotland and En-
gland and therefore could avail himself of English law.7 8
In reaching this holding, Sir Coke differentiated between land
acquired by descent, as was the case with Scotland, and land acquired
via conquest. The citizens of kingdoms acquired by descent were sub-
jects of the monarch because the lands became a part of England's
realm; therefore both parties were bound by the laws of the English
realm and any changes to the laws could only be effectuated by the
Parliament. 79 For lands acquired by conquest, on the other hand, the
King had the absolute authority to "to give the conquered territory
whatever law he chose" within certain limitations.8 0 Coke further di-
vided lands acquired by conquest into two categories: Christian lands
and "infidel" lands. For Christian conquests, local laws remained in
effect until the King decided otherwise.8 1 Once the laws of England
were extended to the conquered Christian land, as with a land ac-
quired by descent, only an act of Parliament could alter the legal
regime.8 2 For conquered infidel lands, the local laws were immediately
abolished and the King and his appointed judges could mete out justice
as deemed fit until a new code was adopted.8 3 Thus, in the 1694 case of
75. NASSER HUSSAIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EMERGENCY: COLONIALISM AND THE RULE
OF LAW 45 (The University of Michigan Press, 4th ed., 2006).
76. See DUKER, supra note 21, at 95.
77. Id.




82. See DUKER, supra note 21, at 95.
83. See id.
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Blankard v. Galdy, the court ruled that because Jamaica was a con-
quered land, "not pleaded to be parcel of the kingdom of England, but
part of the possessions.., of the Crown, the laws of England did not
take place there, until declared so by the conqueror or his successor."
4
This case illustrates that in infidel conquered lands, an ad hoc system
of justice would remain until the King, or one of his agents, applied law
to the acquired land. The colonies were considered infidel kingdoms
and it was not until the passage of the 1772 Privy Council Memoran-
dum that it was made clear that in conquered territory, with either no
law or governed by non-Christian law, that the laws on England would
immediately become the law of the land.85
Thus, the nature of the relationship between the conquered
land and England determines the scope of the Writ's reach. Still, the
history is not uniform. For example, in 1971, the Queen's Bench ruled
that the Writ did not extend to Northern Ireland.8 6 Yet, the Writ had
previously been issued to this same land in the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries.8 7 And after the Isle of Man was purchased by the
Crown in 1765, although it was not considered a colony or a part of the
United Kingdom, because it was considered a dominion of the Crown,
the Writ reached that land. 8 Similarly, the Writ reached the Channel
Islands after the land was annexed to the English Crown even though
these islands were not a part of the United Kingdom.8 9 Finally, while
the Great Writ did not extend to Scotland before the union of the
thrones, the ascension of King James I did not alter Scotland's legal
regime for the purposes of the writ of habeas corpus because Scottish
law prevailed. 90
It is against this background of the evolution of the writ of
habeas corpus that this paper will examine some historical cases in an
effort to decipher the Founders' understanding of the extraterritorial
reach of the Great Writ.
84. See DUKER, supra note 21, at 96.
85. Id. at 97.
86. See SHARPE, supra note 41, at 192.
87. See CLARK, supra note 53, at 171. See also King v. Cowle, 97 Eng. Rep. 587, 600
(1759) (noting that the Writ reached Ireland).
88. See CLARK, supra note 53, at 26.
89. See SHARPE, supra note 41, at 192.
90. Id. at 191.
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B. The Extraterritorial Reach of the Writ of Habeas Corpus at
Common Law
There are numerous cases that shed light on the territorial am-
bit of the Great Writ at common law. This portion of the paper will
review two of these cases and explore the reach of habeas corpus in
eighteenth century India.
In the 1759 case Rex v. Cowle, the issue before the King's Bench
was whether the Writ reached Berwick, land formerly under Scottish
control that had become part of the King's dominion with the unifica-
tion of the thrones. Rejecting Coke's reasoning in Calvin's Case, Lord
Mansfield ruled that the Writ reached Berwick. 91 Although the Writ
did not traditionally run to Scotland because the land had retained its
own local courts, Berwick itself was not subject to Scottish law and,
therefore, had no court from which to issue the Writ locally. 92 Thus,
Lord Mansfield was vexed by the notion that but for the reach of the
Writ from the English courts, no law would apply in Berwick.93 He
expressed his concern that the people of Berwick had "no criminal law,
but the law of England; and no criminal jurisdiction, but with such
reference to the law of England," which included the King's Bench.
94
This led him to conclude that "such a creature of law must necessarily
be collected, as part of a kingdom, and subordinate."95 Therefore, read-
ing the scope of the Writ broadly, Lord Mansfield noted that the Great
Writ reached "where the place is under the subjection of the Crown of
England."96 Indeed, while Lord Mansfield noted that the Writ would
not extend to "foreign dominions[I which belong to a prince who suc-
ceeds to the throne of England," he continued on to describe the broad
reach of the Writ, noting that it extended to the plantations (colonies),
Ireland, the Isle of Man, and the recently annexed territories of the
Duchy of Normandy. 97 Finally, Lord Mansfield contended that despite
91. Cowle, 97 Eng. Rep. at 600-05.
92. James E. Pfander, The Limits of Habeas Jurisdiction and the Global War on
Terror, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 512-13 (2006). While Berwick did have a Court of Sessions,
Lord Mansfield noted the corporation-justices at Berwick were not competent to adjudicate
Cowle's case in part because the justices had predetermined the petitioner's guilt "without
waiting for a trial on the indictment." Cowle, 97 Eng. Rep. at 604. This was because the
charge of assault against Cowle arose from a riot that ensued "at an assembly of the
corporation, in consequence of a violent division which engaged the whole body." Cowle, 97
Eng. Rep. at 603 (internal citations omitted).
93. Cowle, 97 Eng. Rep. at 601.
94. Id. at 599.
95. Id. at 598.
96. Id. at 599.
97. Id. at 599-600.
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what authority a court may have to issue the Writ, if the court could
not adjudicate the issue or enforce a proper remedy, the court should
decline to issue the Writ.98
Lord Mansfield again tackled the extraterritorial reach of the
Great Writ in the 1774 case Mostyn v. Fabrigas. Although this case
involved a tort suit for false imprisonment, it is illustrative of the ex-
traterritorial reach of habeas because the "remedy of habeas corpus for
wrongful imprisonment was thought to be necessarily concomitant
with the recognition of civil liability for the same trespass."99 Plaintiff-
Fabrigas, a native of Minorca, had won in a suit against the Military
Governor Mostyn for false imprisonment and trespass. 100 Minorca had
been ceded to England by the Spanish in 1713.101 On appeal, Mostyn
argued that English courts had no jurisdiction over a cause of action
arising in Minorca. 10 2 Rejecting this argument, Lord Mansfield upheld
a native-born subject's right to sue in English courts, even though the
subject was born and located outside of the territorial ambit of En-
gland. 10 3 Echoing his reasoning in Cowle, Lord Mansfield reasoned
that unless the Military Governor could demonstrate that a local court
would have jurisdiction over the tort, the King's Bench would assert
jurisdiction and apply English common law.1°4 Because only an En-
glish court was competent to review the authority delegated to a
military governor by the King, no local court could have asserted juris-
diction over the claim, thereby vesting jurisdiction in the English
courts. 10 5 At the same time, Lord Mansfield emphasized that Fabri-
gas, though a native Minorcan, was clearly among the King's
subjects. 10
6
Although Britain did not assert formal sovereignty over India
until the Act of 1813, English courts extended the writ of habeas
corpus to India during the time when the Moghul Empire was officially
recognized as retaining sovereignty, but while the East India Trading
Company was actually controlling the laws. 0 7 Beginning with its first
98. Id. at 600.
99. HUSSAIN, supra note 75, at 74.
100. Pfander, supra note 92, at 510-11.
101. HUSSAIN, supra note 75, at 77.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 78.
104. Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1028 (K.B. 1774).
105. Mostyn, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1028-29.
106. HUSSAIN, supra note 75, at 78.
107. Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2530 (2005).
Britain delayed declaring formal sovereignty over India until the Act of 1813. During that
time, the Mohgul Empire still retained "formal sovereignty" over India, but laws were also
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Royal Charter in 1765, the East India Trading Company assumed sov-
ereignty over its trading posts in India and promulgated laws
applicable to its representatives in the Company's territories, includ-
ing large portions of land beyond the actual trading posts.' 0 8 A mixed
system of Indian and British laws existed until the 1773 Regulating
Act established English law throughout Calcutta. 10 9 The 1773 Act es-
tablished a Governor-General in Bengal and empowered him to issue
Company regulations, enforceable in Company courts, as well as laws
for the "presidency town." 10 At the same time, the 1773 Act created a
Supreme Court in Calcutta to adjudicate specific English laws that
reached the British occupied territories as well as certain fundamental
common law concepts.
Thus, while the 1773 Act did not specifically state that the
Court was authorized to issue the Great Writ, the Calcutta Court's ju-
risdiction was construed to possess the authority to issue writs of
habeas corpus over a narrow class of people."' The Calcutta Supreme
Court's criminal jurisdiction reached both British and natives in Cal-
cutta alike and British subjects throughout India." 2 Still, as the
stronghold of the Mughal Empire over India collapsed in the later half
of the eighteenth century, it was unclear whether British occupied ter-
ritories were to be ruled by the law of the Company or by the law of the
Crown. 1
13
Regardless of the confusion, English courts issued writs of
habeas corpus to India. Sir Elijah Impey was installed as the Cal-
cutta's Court's first Chief Justice in 1774." 4 In 1775, Sir Impey issued
a writ of habeas corpus and sent a letter to the Governor-General
stating:
though the natives are without Question under your General Pro-
tection, they are more immediately so under the laws. I have no
doubt but the laws will be found to be in practice what they are
meted out by the Crown and the East India Trading Company. Id. See also Boumediene,
476 F.3d at 1003-04 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
108. See generally Elizabeth Kolsky, Codification and the Rule of Colonial Difference:
Criminal Procedure in British India, LAW & HIST. REV. 631, 643-45 (2005); Amicus Curiae
Brief of Legal Historians, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), 2004 WL 96756 (submitted
Jan. 14, 2004).
109. See HUSSAIN, supra note 75, at 146.
110. Id. at 80.
111. Id. at 79; CLARK, supra note 53, at 21.
112. See HUSSAIN, supra note 75, at 80. This Calcutta court remained in operation until
1861 when the Indian High Courts Acts established a new system of courts. Id. at 81.
113. See, e.g., id. at 80-81; Amicus Brief for Legal Historians, supra note 108, at *15
nn.49-52.
114. See HUSSAIN, supra note 75, at 80.
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universally esteemed in theory, a better security to the people than
the discretionary power of any council. 115
That same year Sir Impey issued a writ of habeas corpus to the Com-
pany, demanding the production of Kemaluddin Khan, a revenue
collector detained over a financial dispute. 11 6 Sir Impey rested his au-
thority to issue the Writ on Blackstone's Commentaries, which noted
that the judges of the King's Bench" 7 could issue such Writs to "all
parts of the King's dominions, for the King is entitled ... to have an
account of why the liberty of any of his subjects are restrained."'" 8 Yet,
it is unclear whether Khan was in fact one of the King's subjects as he
was merely an employee of sorts of the Company - he collected the
Company's revenues. Still, when the Company failed to return the
Writ, a second Writ was issued and the Company was held in con-
tempt. 1 9 Another Writ was issued in 1777 by the Calcutta Court to
test the legality of the detention of a native imprisoned by a local court
in Bengal. 120 Still, the scope of the Calcutta Court's jurisdiction was
narrow, reaching only Calcutta residents, "Company servants," and
British born subjects residing in occupied territories; it had no author-
ity over the local criminal courts or the Company's civil and criminal
courts for natives.' 21 The Court's practice of issuing writs of habeas
corpus to challenge the detention of Company employees was limited
by a 1781 Act, prompted by complaints to Parliament by the Com-
pany's Governor-Generals, which restricted the Court's jurisdiction
over revenue collectors. 122
This brief survey of the extraterritorial application of the Great
Writ by the English courts demonstrates that while the Writ did have
great reach, the length of the court's arm was not infinite; it depended
upon what was considered the "King's dominion" and whom was con-
sidered to be a subject of the King. The following section will analogize
these cases to the detainees' confinement in Guantanamo Bay, con-
cluding that the Supreme Court should hold that the Great Writ
extends to the military base.
115. Id. at 81.
116. Id.
117. Id. The judges on the Calcutta Court were selected from the King's Bench.
Therefore, Sir Impey had the requisite authority to issue the Writ.
118. Id.
119. Amicus Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 108, at 12-14.
120. Id. at 14 n.44.
121. HussAIN, supra note 75, at 82.
122. Id. at 83.
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III. THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY APPLICATION OF THE GREAT WRIT
REACHES GUANTANAMO BAY
History suggests that the common law writ of habeas corpus
would extend to the detainees in Guantanamo Bay. This section will
explore how the history supports the contention that the extraterrito-
rial ambit of the Great Writ reaches the military base by arguing first
that the Guantanamo Bay is for all intents and purposes part of the
United States. Next, this section notes that, like the non-English sub-
jects who could avail themselves of the Great Writ's protections, the
detainees at Guantanamo Bay have a similarly close relationship with
the United States such that they too fall within the Writ's reach. Fi-
nally, this section contends that if the Writ does not reach the military
base, Guantanamo Bay remains a legal black hole, the very evil Lord
Mansfield condemned in his seventeenth century habeas opinions.
A. Guantanamo Bay Is Part of the United States' Domain
The United States has formally occupied the military base at
Guantanamo Bay Cuba since executing a lease in 1903.123 Cuba and
the United States entered into a treaty in 1934 providing that the U.S.
could maintain its base until it was voluntarily abandoned. 124 Pursu-
ant to the 1903 Lease, while Cuba retains ultimate sovereignty over
the land, "the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and
control over and within said areas."1 25 The detainees currently held at
the military base and petitioning the Court for habeas corpus are not
United States citizens. 126 Thus, the statutory habeas-stripping provi-
sions of the MCA raised the issue of whether the constitutional right to
habeas corpus reaches to those aliens detained by the United States in
Guantanamo Bay. As noted above, two judges on the D.C. Circuit re-
cently held that it does not.
127
Some jurists and scholars emphatically argue that the histori-
cal record does not support the extension of the Great Writ to the
detainees' claims. 128 In Johnson v. Eisentrager, the Court noted that it
123. Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, Art. III,
T.S. No. 418 (hereinafter "1903 Lease").
124. Treaty Defining Relations with Cuba, May 29, 1934, U.S.-Cuba, Art. III, 48 Stat.
1683, T.S. No. 866.
125. 1903 Lease, supra note 123.
126. See e.g. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 984.
127. Id.
128. See e.g., J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global
Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 521-22 (2007); Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 990-91.
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW
was unaware of any "instance where a court, in this or any other coun-
try ... has issued [the Writ] on behalf of an alien enemy, who, at no
relevant time and in stage of his captivity, has been within its territo-
rial jurisdiction. Nothing in the Constitution extends such a right."129
In doing so, the Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to review the
habeas petitions of German nationals tried by a United States military
commission in China and confined to serve their sentence in a German
prison. 130 In Rasul, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas, reaffirmed Eisentrager and engaged in an in-
depth historical analysis to conclude that the Writ would not have ex-
tended at common law to the detainees.13 '
Eisentrager's holding has been called into question by Rasul. In
his decisive Rasul concurrence, Justice Kennedy distinguished Eisen-
trager, noting that Guantanamo Bay "is in every practical respect a
United States territory" because the United States enjoys unfettered
use of the land at the United States pleasure.132 Justice Kennedy also
reasoned that unlike the German prisoners in Eisentrager, who had
already had their status adjudicated by a military commission, the de-
tainees at Guantanamo were subject to indefinite pre-trial detention as
there was no process in place to determine their status as enemy com-
batants or to adjudicate their guilt or innocence; indeed, most
detainees were not charged with any specific crime.' 33 Despite this
permissive language, since the passage of the MCA, opponents of
habeas application to the detainees have pointed to the "ultimate sov-
ereignty" language of the 1903 Lease and Eisentrager's dicta that the
Constitution does not extend habeas to aliens detained on foreign soil
to support the notion that the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to
review detainees' petitions. Since Rasul, Justice O'Connor, who voted
with the majority, has retired and Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito have been appointed to the bench. Therefore, Justice Kennedy's
opinion on the constitutional basis for the territorial ambit of the Great
Writ may turn out to be more crucial than ever before.
While it is true that history supports the notion that the Writ
would only extend extraterritorially to the King's domains and would
129. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950).
130. Id. at 790.
131. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 502-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
133. Id. Only a handful of the detainees were charged with a crime before the passage
of the MCA. See Azmy, supra note 64, at 374.
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not reach foreign lands,134 because of the 1903 Lease's unique history,
Guantanamo Bay is best characterized as part of the United States'
domain. The majority in Rasul seems ready and willing to accept this
very notion. 135 The land at Guantanamo Bay was first occupied by the
United States after its victory in the Spanish-American War in
1898.136 As a condition of the United States' withdrawal of its military
forces and its simultaneous recognition of Cuba's independence, the
Cuban government executed the 1903 Lease.1 37 Thus, the 1903 Lease
was not a bargain entered into by two equal parties. Rather, the quid
pro quo occurred between a conquered territory emerging as a new na-
tion and the occupying authority. Indeed, Guantanamo Bay is best
characterized as a spoil of the Spanish-American War.' 38 Thus, the
United States has maintained uninterrupted and exclusive control
over Guantanamo Bay since the late nineteenth century. Beyond the
clause in the 1903 Lease granting a right of reversion in the event that
both parties to the contract agree to terminate the lease, the indepen-
dent nation of Cuba has never had any meaningful legal authority over
the land. From this perspective, Guantanamo Bay is as much a part of
the United States "domain" as Minorca, captured by England during
the War of Spanish Succession and ceded to victorious Britain as part
of the Treaty of Utrecht, was considered to be part of England. 39 Just
as the Writ reached from England to this conquered and ceded land,
the Writ should reach Guantanamo Bay.
Furthermore, a wide variety of "foreign lands" were considered
to be within the Crown's domain. Indeed, the Writ reached to foreign
lands acquired by conquest and annexation. The Writ reached the con-
quered colonies in North America, the purchased Isle of Man, and the
annexed Channel Islands. Before the Irish Parliament passed its own
habeas act in 1782, the Writ was issued by the English courts to this
134. See Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 66, at 599-600; Cowle, 97
Eng. Rep. at 601.
135. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Concurring in
the judgment, Justice Kennedy argued that the United States had exercised "unchallenged
and indefinite control" over the military base, leading him to conclude that Guantanamo
Bay "belongs to the United States."
136. Raustiala, supra note 107, at 2536.
137. See e.g., Azmy, supra note 64, at 383. Professor Azmy notes that this type of lease
agreement was "a common feature of colonial era arrangements, where colonial powers
indulged in a fiction of the occupied territory's independence, pursuant to which such
territory might actually engage in a meaningful surrender of its rights."
138. See Raustiala, supra note 107, at 2536 (noting that the 1903 Lease is a "direct
legacy of a colonial relationship").
139. HUSSAIN, supra note 75, at 77.
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foreign land. 140 The Writ was also issued in narrow circumstances in
India during a period where control over the law and the natives was
shared by the declining Mogul Empire, the East India Trading Com-
pany and the Crown. Admittedly, Justice Scalia would contend that in
all of these cases the territory to which the Writ extended was within
the King's domain, and therefore, was not considered a foreign land. 141
Yet, if the writ of habeas corpus extended to the purchased Isle of Man,
why not extend the same right to the leased land at Guantanamo Bay?
Guantanamo Bay is analogous to these lands considered part of
the King's domain in that whatever law existed prior to the King's ac-
quiring of the territory was abrogated by the Crown's authority. Like
the above noted cases, Cuban law is inoperative within the territorial
ambit of the base. 142 Indeed, like English law in the colonies, the Isle
of Man, and the Channel Islands, United States law has completely
abrogated the pre-1903 Lease law as it existed. 143 With the exception
of the detainees, United States law, including criminal and labor law,
applies to both the actions of United States citizens and aliens that
occur within the confines of the base.1 4 4 Furthermore, Sharpe notes
that consistent with the 1679 Habeas Act, "the mere fact that the place
where the prisoner is held is outside the ambit of the Writ will not
necessarily deprive the court of the power to act."' 45 Rather, what is
more determinative than locus of imprisonment is whether "there is
someone within the jurisdiction who can be made respondent to the
writ .... and whether he... has the power to bring the detention to an
end."' 46 This conception of Guantanamo Bay is consistent with the
1772 Privy Council Memoramdum, which noted that in conquered ter-
ritory, where no law applied, the laws of England would immediately
become effective. The same logic applies to the military base because
the 1903 Lease immediately abrogated Cuban law and declared that
the United States would exercise absolute control over the jurisdiction.
140. CLARK, supra note 53, at 170.
141. Cf., The Writ did not reach Scotland because it was considered a foreign land
outside the King's dominion. SHARPE, supra note 41, at 191.
142. Azmy, supra note 64, at 385-87.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 385.
145. SHARPE, supra note 41, at 199.
146. Id.
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B. The Relationship Between the Detainees and the United States Is
Analogous to the Historical Subject-Sovereign Association that
Justified the Extension of the Writ to Non-English Subjects
The historical case law suggests that the Writ reached only sub-
jects of the King. Justice Scalia and D.C. Circuit Judge Randolf
thereby argue that the detainees do not enjoy a constitutional right to
habeas corpus because they are aliens. While it is true that the histori-
cal cases involve the King's subjects, the prolonged confinement of the
detainees by the United States has created a similar relationship, sup-
porting the notion that the Writ would reach the detainees at common
law despite their alien status.
The subject-sovereign relationship justifying the extraterrito-
rial reach of the Writ at common law to natives of "foreign lands" was
not entered into by consent. Rather, the subject-sovereign association
was foisted upon non-English subjects by the Crown. For example, in
Cowle, the petitioner became the King's subject because of the ascen-
sion of King James I to the English throne. In Mostyn, the plaintiff
was a subject of the Crown because Minorca was captured by the Brit-
ish Navy in 1708 during the War of the Spanish Succession.147 In the
Khan case, Sir Impey classified the petitioner as a subject of the maj-
esty because he was a "Company servant."148 In all of these cases,
where the Writ was applied to natives who were deemed subjects of the
Crown, none of the natives chose to enter into the subject-sovereign
relationship with the King. Rather, they were subjects of the Crown
because they were under the control of the King's representatives and
of the Crown's laws. Indeed, they had no choice but to be subjects of
the Crown. The natives of Scotland, Minorca and India enjoyed the
privilege of the Writ, despite the fact that at no time were they consid-
ered English - they were merely under the Crown's control. In the
same vein, the detainees are subjects of the United States.
While the detainees remain citizens of other countries, a sub-
ject-sovereign relationship has been foisted upon the Guantanamo Bay
prisoners because they are at the exclusive mercy of the United States
government's prerogative. The detainees are being held in a United
States military prison separated from their native lands by an ocean.
They have been detained incommunicado for over five years, having
little to no contact with their families or with their own govern-
ments.1 49 Furthermore, the detainees are subject to United States law
147. HUSSAIN, supra note 75, at 77.
148. HUSSAIN, supra note 75, at 82.
149. See e.g, Azmy, supra note 64, at 431 n.100.
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in the form of the Military Commissions Act: their enemy combatant
status is determined by the United States government and they are
subject to tribunals presided over by the United States military. In the
military tribunals, the government builds a case against the detainees
and holds the prisoner accountable for violations of United States
law.150 As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez,
the United States' actions with respect to the imprisoned aliens have
made them among the "governed."151 Indeed, it is the United States
treatment of the detainees as members "of our community for the pur-
poses of enforcing our laws," and the fact that the detainees "may well
spend the rest of [their lives] in a United States prison," that created
the relationship necessary to support extension of the Writ to the de-
tainees' claims.' 52 Therefore, while the detainees remain aliens, their
legal status vis-&-vis the United States is identical to the status of the
Scottish, Minorcan and Indian natives vis-&-vis the Crown. Thus, a
sufficient nexus exists between the detainees and the United States to
invoke the Writ.
C. Guantanamo Bay Is a Legal Black Hole without Habeas Corpus
Without the application of the constitutional right to habeas
corpus, Guantanamo Bay exists in a legal vacuum. Of the 400 prison-
ers currently detained at Guantanamo Bay, only a mere ten were
charged with crimes before the passage of the MCA.' 53 The remaining
prisoners had been classified under the unilateral authority of the
Bush Administration as "unlawful enemy combatants," thereby con-
demning the prisoners to indefinite detention.154 The detainees' status
as enemy combatants was confirmed by a Combatant Status Review
Tribunal ("CSRT"), an ad hoc tribunal established in the wake of the
Rasul decision. 155 While designation as an enemy combatant results
in indefinite detention until such time as the "War on Terror" is won or
until the Administration determines that the detainee is no longer a
threat, 156 these individuals have not been indicted for any crime.
157
Still, a detainee who is classified as an enemy combatant may be sub-
150. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2624-31
(2007) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950p) (listing the substantive offenses).
151. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 284 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
152. Id.
153. Azmy, supra note 64, at 374.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 399-400.
156. See Azmy, supra note 64, at 430-31.
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ject to trial by military commission.' 58 Yet the Administration has
intimated that they plan to refer only sixty to seventy prisoners to the
commissions for trial. 159 Prosecution pursuant to the authority
granted to the Executive Branch in the MCA has been initiated against
only three detainees.160 Furthermore, the MCA does not require that a
CSRT determine a detainee's status.' 6 ' Indeed, the President can uni-
laterally designate a detainee an enemy combatant. 62 Section 7(a) of
the MCA strips the federal courts' habeas jurisdiction to hear detain-
ees' claims challenging their status as enemy combatants, and section
3 removes federal court jurisdiction over any claim challenging "the
prosecution, trial, or judgment of a military commission."' 63 The MCA
also strips jurisdiction over detainees whose status has not yet been
determined by a CSRT.164 Therefore, the MCA permits pre-charge, in-
definite executive detention while simultaneously forestalling any
judicial review of the basis for detention. In turn, hundreds of detain-
ees have been held by the United States for more than five years
without being charged with a crime and without having a meaningful
opportunity to challenge their status as enemy combatants. The ma-
jority of Guantanamo Bay detainees will languish, branded as enemy
combatants but never charged with a crime nor brought to trial. If the
constitutional right to habeas corpus does not extend to Guantanamo
Bay, prisoners claiming innocence have no judicial forum in which they
can dispute their classification and confinement. Indeed, the MCA
157. Jonathan Hafetz, Vindicating the Rule of Law, 31-WTR FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
25, 35 (2007).
158. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 3(a) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948c).
159. Jim Garamone, Office of Military Commissions Refers Charge Against "Australian
Taliban," March 1, 2007, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2007/03/sec-
070301-afps0l.htm.
160. Only five detainees, David Hicks, Omar Ahmed Khadr, Salim Hamdan, Almend
Mohammed Ahmed Haza al Darbi, and Mohammed Kamin have been charged with crimes
pursuant to the MCA. Commission Cases, Department of Defense, at http://www.
defenselink.mil/news/commissions.html. In March 2007, Hicks plead guilty and was
sentenced to nine months in prison, to be served in his native Australia. Detainee
Convicted of Terrorism Charge at Guantanamo Trial, Department of Defense (March 30,
2007) at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10678. Khadr and
Hamdan are still awaiting trial.
161. Michael C, Dorf, The Orwellian Military Commissions Act of 2006, 5 J. INTL. CRIM.
JUST. 10, 15-16 (2007).
162. Id.
163. Military Commissions Act of 2006 §§ 7(a), 3 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 950j).
164. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7(a)(1) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2241).
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forestalls "even a threshold determination by the courts as to the bona
fides of their detention."
16 5
The MCA's court-stripping provisions perpetuate the legal
black hole that has been characteristic of Guantanamo Bay from the
beginning of the detentions. This is the very sort of executive action
that the seventeenth century habeas acts aimed to cure. Yet, without
the constitutional application of habeas to the detainees' claims, there
is no court competent to issue the Great Writ. Thus, denying the de-
tainees the right to petition for habeas corpus runs afoul of one of the
justifications for extraterritorial application of the Great Writ: the con-
cern over a geographically defined law-free zone in which the King
could detain individuals outside of the confines of the rule of law. In
both Cowle and Mostyn, Lord Mansfield expressed his concern that if
the English common law Writ did not reach Berwick and Minorca,
there would be no court that had jurisdiction to hear the petitioners'
grievances. 166 This concern echoed the principles embodied in the
Magna Carta and in the seventeenth century habeas acts. Both were
concerned with a person's fundamental right to freedom. The habeas
acts were enacted in order to cure the evil of the executive's depriva-
tion of an individual's liberty without legal cause.167 Justice Kennedy
mirrored this reasoning in Rasul when he noted disturbingly that the
detainees were subject to pre-trial detention in perpetuity. Similarly,
because Cuba exercises no legal authority over the detainees' claims
and because the MCA strips the federal judiciary's jurisdiction, Guan-
tanamo Bay is a law free zone where individuals designated as enemy
combatants can be detained in perpetuity.
The fact that the MCA affords detainees some legal process does
not weaken the conclusion that, absent the constitutional application
of habeas to the prisoners, Guantanamo Bay is a legal black hole, be-
165. Amicus Curiae Brief of Bruce A. Ackerman, et al., Hamdan v. Gates, 127 S. Ct.
1507, 2007 WL 1050158, *15 (submitted March 29, 2007).
166. Cowle, 97 Eng. Rep. at 601;-Mostyn, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1028.
167. The Bush Administration chose to imprison the detainees at Guantanamo Bay
because the Administration believed the military base would be beyond the jurisdictional
reach of United States courts. See David G. Savage, Habeas Corpus Rights of Guantanamo
Detainees are Still Up in the Air, 16 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 3 (April 20, 2007). This runs
contrary to one of the main reforms contained in the 1679 Habeas Act, that made it illegal
for officials to relocate prisoners to lands where the Act would not reach to avoid return of a
duly issued Writ. Indeed, Parliament considered this practice as so contrary to the
fundamental rule of law that it provided for severe economic damages, as well as contempt
of court, for officials who violated this provision. The Guantanamo Bay detainees could
similarly argue that relocating them from the various countries in which they were
captured into a land the Bush Administration believed was beyond the jurisdiction of
United States courts violates at the very least the spirit of habeas corpus as enshrined in
the 1679 Act.
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cause the MCA's provisions are not co-extensive with the rights
guaranteed by the common law Writ. At its core, habeas corpus en-
tailed an independent judicial review and challenge to the practice of
without-cause detention by the Crown. 168 The seventeenth century
habeas acts were "calculated to set bounds to the arbitrary proceedings
... and preserve to those who fell under [the Crown's] displeasure from
being sent into banishment or otherwise imprisoned, without cause,
measure, or relief."169 Thus, the 1679 Act permitted a prisoner to re-
view a copy of the warrant detailing the cause for his commitment.
170
Astonishingly, the warrant must have been produced within six hours
of the request "under a penalty of 100 pounds to the prisoner."1 71 This
is a far cry from the multi-year pre-indictment detention to which the
Guantanamo Bay prisoners are subjected.
Furthermore, one of the greatest reforms of the 1679 Act was to
provide for a speedy trial. 72 The Act demanded that a detained indi-
vidual either be indicted for a crime within "one term or session after
commitment... and to be either tried within two terms or sessions or
discharged."1 73 In the Opinion of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, it was
noted that petitions should receive a "speedy and immediate execu-
tion."' 74 Thus, the "design of the Act was to prevent a man's lying
under an accusation . . . above two terms.' 75 As Professor Sharpe
noted, the 1679 Act served two purposes: the first was to "test the va-
lidity of the warrant and charges from the moment of incarceration,"
and the second was to ensure that "if these preliminary grounds for
detention were found to be sufficient, the accused was then able to de-
mand to be either brought quickly to trial.., or released."' 76 The MCA
falls far short of both these purposes. Nearly all of the detainees have
not been indicted; rather, they have merely been designated by the
CSRTs as enemy combatants. Moreover, the MCA denies detainees
the right to a speedy trial. 77 Indeed, after five years of imprisonment,
a time period far exceeding the duration of permissible detention under
168. See e.g., Church, supra note 21, at 137-38.
169. Id. at 16.
170. 31 CAR. II., A.D. 1679; See Church, supra note 21, at 26.
171. Church, supra note 21, at 26.
172. 31 CAR. II., A.D. 1679. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 3(a)(1) (codified at 10
U.S.C. § 950g).
173. SHARPE, supra note 41, at 137.
174. Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 97 Eng. Rep. 29, 32 (H.L. 1758).
175. Id. at 137 (quoting Crosby's Case, 12 Mod. 66 (1694).
176. Id. at 138.
177. Military Commissions Act of 2006 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948(b)(d)(A).
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the 1679 Act, only three detainees have been indicted on criminal
charges.
The legal process provided for by the MCA and the CSRTs, dis-
cussed infra, do not resemble the procedural protections typical of
habeas corpus at common law. Therefore, in addition to perpetuating
the legal black hole at Guantanamo Bay, the minimal process afforded
to the detainees is not an inadequate substitute for habeas. 178 Sir Mat-
thew Hale, Chief Justice of the King's Bench from 1671-1676, noted
that the purpose of the Writ was to determine "whether the imprifon-
ment be good or erroneous." 179 At common law, a court reviewing a
habeas petition would look beyond the Crown's charge and engage in a
searching factual inquiry to ascertain whether detention was justi-
fied.180 Habeas "provided a remedy where pre-trial proceedings had
been defective."18 1 This inquiry occurred both when the imprisoned
was charged with a crime and when "an accused person was committed
for trial without preliminary proceedings of a judicial character."1 8 2 At
this early stage, a prisoner could challenge "that the evidence was too
weak to warrant pre-trial detention or that the charges were deficient
in law."1 8 3 The jailor, in turn, had an opportunity to justify the legal
and evidentiary basis for committal.184 Thus, a seventeenth century
habeas court would examine the "caufe of the fufpicion" relied upon to
justify pre-trial confinement. 8 5 Indeed, in the Opinion of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus, Justice Wilmot contended that the court need not rely
exclusively on the assertions of the Crown in support of imprison-
ment. 8 6 Rather, a judge reviewing a habeas petition is not
so bound by the facts in the return to the writ.., that they cannot
discharge the person brought before them, if it shall most mani-
festly appear to the Judges.. . that such return is false in fact, and
that the person so brought up is restrained of his liberty by the
178. Swain, 430 U.S. at 381 (holding that a "remedy which is neither inadequate nor
ineffective to test the legality of a person's detention does not constitute a suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus").
179. SIR MATTHEW HALE, 1 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 583 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd reprinted 2003) (1736).
180. See SHARPE, supra note 41, at 129.
181. Id. at 128.
182. Id. at 129.
183. Id.
184. See SHARPE, supra note 41, at 64.
185. SIR MATTHEW HALE, 2 HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 110 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd reprinted 2003) (1736).
186. Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 97 ENG. REP. 29, 36 (H.L. 1758).
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most unwarrantable means, and in direct violation of law and
justice.1
8 7
For even serious allegations of wrongdoing, the habeas court would re-
view the depositions "to see whether there [was] sufficient evidence to
detain [the accused] in custody."'8 8 If the charges were deficient, or if
there was inadequate evidence to support the allegations, the court
would order the prisoner released.189
The CSRTs fall short of the legal process guaranteed by the sev-
enteenth century habeas acts. While the Administration would
contend that a CSRT's determination that a detainee is an unlawful
enemy combatant provides a sufficient substitute for habeas review,
this argument is not persuasive because the Tribunals afford the de-
tainees little process. First, when a CSRT designates a detainee as an
enemy combatant, the proceedings do not result in the detainee being
indicted for a crime. As noted above, the seventeenth century habeas
acts were enacted to eliminate prolonged pre-indictment and pre-trail
detention. Second, the CSRT proceedings are not akin to the indepen-
dent judicial determination of the legal basis for detainment,
characteristic of common law habeas review, where the government
and the accused engage in an adversarial process. Rather, more often
than not, the CSRTs are merely a means to justify continuing the im-
prisonment of the detainees.
A recent review of 102 CSRT proceedings is illustrative. For
example, in eighty-nine percent of the hearings no evidence was
presented on behalf of the detainee. 190 Furthermore, in all of the
Tribunals, the government did not call any witness on its own behalf,
relying instead on "the presumption that the classified evidence was
sufficient to establish that the detainee was an enemy combatant."' 9 1
In the rare instances in which declassified evidence was presented to
the CSRT, the evidence did not contain "any specific information about
the Government's basis for the detainee's detention as an enemy com-
batant.1 92 Indeed, in the three instances where a CSRT determined
that a detainee was not an enemy combatant, the detainee was not
187. Id.
188. SHARPE, supra note 41, at 128 (quoting Rex v. Homer, 1 Leach 270, 270-71; 168
E.R. 237 (1783)).
189. Id. at 129.
190. Marx Denbeaux, et al., No-Hearing Hearings, CSRT: The Modern Habeas Corpus?
3 (Seton Hall University School of Law), available at http://law.shu.edunews/final-no
hearinghearingsreport.pdf.
191. Id. at 5.
192. Id.
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informed of this result and subsequent CSRTs were convened until the
initial determination was reversed.
193
The flawed process whereby a detainee is deemed an enemy
combatant is exacerbated by the fact that the detainee has no mean-
ingful way to challenge the designation. MCA section 9, which slightly
modifies Detainee Treatment Act ("DTA") section 1005(e)(3), does pro-
vide for a limited review exclusively in the D.C. Circuit for a detainee
challenging his enemy combatant status.194 The MCA confers a simi-
larly narrow right to review a military commission's determination in
the D.C. Circuit. 195 This review, however, does not resemble common
law habeas. Rather, the restrictive scope of review limits the D.C. Cir-
cuit to analyzing whether "the status determination of the Combatant
Status Review Tribunal with regard to such alien was consistent with
the standards and procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense for
Combatant Status Review Tribunals.' 196 The D.C. Circuit may not in-
quire into the factual basis for detention or into the strength of the
evidence. This limited scope of procedural review is much different
than the searching factual inquiry undertaken by common law habeas
courts. Furthermore, this narrow review occurs only after a CSRT
makes a "final decision" on a detainee's status,197 or until after the de-
tainee exhausts the appellate procedures set forth in the MCA. 198 This
finality requirement runs contrary to the practice at common law
whereby an accused could challenge the legality of an imprisonment
almost immediately upon committal.
The MCA's limited judicial review and jurisdiction-stripping
provisions exacerbate the legal black hole swallowing the detainees'
claims. Indeed, the process afforded to the detainees is an inadequate
substitute as compared to the common law practice whereby prisoners
could challenge the sufficiency of the charges and the evidence levied
against them before trial. In combination, the MCA and the DTA pro-
vide no meaningful, independent judicial venue whereby detainees can
challenge the very designation that results in their indefinite detain-
ment. This lack of legal process belies the very purpose of the Great
Writ as understood at common law. Indeed, if the constitutional guar-
193. Id. at 6.
194. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 9; Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
§ 1005(e)(3), Public Law 109-148, 119 Stat. 2740 (2007) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801).
195. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 3(a)(1) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950g).
196. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i) (codified at 10 U.S.C.
§ 801(e)(2)(C)(i).
197. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(e)(2) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801(e)(2)(A).
198. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 3(a)(1) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950g).
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antee of habeas corpus does not reach the detainees at Guantanamo
Bay, there will be no independent court to examine the United States'
charges against the detainees and, if appropriate, grant relief. In such
a case, Lord Mansfield's fears will have been realized. Without habeas
corpus, Guantanamo Bay exists in a legal vacuum.
IV. CONCLUSION
History demonstrates that the Great Writ, as understood by the
Founders during the Constitution's framing, would have extended ex-
traterritorially to Guantanamo Bay. The reach of the Writ extended to
all lands within the King's domain and to all of the Crown's subjects.
Similarly, the unique history surrounding Guantanamo Bay leads to
the conclusion that it is as much a part of the United States' domain as
Minorca and India were a part of England's territory. Additionally, the
United States government's prolonged detention of the detainees has
created a sufficient nexus between the aliens and the United States,
mirroring the subject-sovereign association deemed necessary at com-
mon law to permit the extension of the Writ to natives of foreign lands.
Furthermore, without the constitutional application of habeas corpus
to the detainees' claims, Guantanamo Bay exists in a legal vacuum.
The seventeenth century habeas acts were aimed at eliminating
arbitrary imprisonment and regulating lawful detentions by affording
the accused processes guaranteed by the rule of law. Yet, hundreds of
detainees have been imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay for over five years
without being charged with a crime. Rather, they have been deemed
unlawful enemy combatants by the Executive Branch, and are thereby
subject to indefinite detention. This is the very abuse of executive au-
thority that habeas corpus evolved to quash. Moreover, if the
constitutional guarantee of habeas corpus does not extend to Guanta-
namo Bay, the MCA's limited scope of review and court-stripping
provisions seals the detainees to a fate of extensive pre-indictment and
pre-trial detention, as well as indefinite imprisonment. For all of these
reasons, the Supreme Court should rule that the constitutional appli-
cation of the Great Writ extends to Guantanamo Bay. Such a holding
would recognize the detainees' fundamental right to challenge their
status as unlawful enemy combatants and to demand that any further
detention be based upon a criminal charge. By acknowledging the
reach of habeas corpus to the detainees, the Court would restore the
rule of law to Guantanamo Bay.

